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Abstract
This Essay points out the major legal issues related to the development of the Computerized
Reservation Systems (“CRS”) and evaluates whether the EC approach has achieved satisfactory
results, mainly from the standpoint of consumer protection. My critique is essentially that the EC
has ruled the CRS by means of legislation that tends to be hyper-technical, difficult to interpret,
and, at the same time, extremely vague when it comes to defining unlawful conduct and potential
sanctions. This Essay argues that more in-depth regulatory reform should be undertaken by the EC,
in order to enhance competition and benefit travellers. This Essay is structured in two conceptually
interdependent sections. Part I focuses on a synthetic description of CRS and evaluates its potential
to adversely impact a market based on free competition, specifically by violating the antitrust
rules of the Treaty of Rome (“EEC Treaty”). Part II is devoted to an analysis of the most recent
EC regulations in this area, with particular reference to Commission Regulation No. 83/91 of
December 5, 1990. Regulation No. 83/91 gives a basic description of the CRS system within
the framework of EC legislation. The minimal action undertaken thus far by the EC has been
guided by two considerations. First, the area of Computerized Reservation Systems is still legally
unstable and is characterized by gray areas and gaps in the rules that should be resolved by future
EC legislation. Second, in the absence of a line of judicial precedents within the EC, a theoretical
debate appears fruitless in light of the lack of a substantially consolidated position within the EC.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, one of the more interesting issues in
the international air transportation industry has been the major
technological advances in information processing and the trans-
mission of data by telecommunication systems.' These techno-
logical improvements have impacted the air transportation in-
dustry in two major ways. First, from a practical stand point,
these developments have stressed the need for a more sophisti-
cated formation of operation panels according to specialized
criteria. This peculiar industry need has emphasized the neces-
sity for air carriers and the other related enterprises to enact
business policies with massive economic investments in advanced
technology and in service distribution networks.2  Second,
from a legal perspective, this "technological revolution" has
given rise to a series of complex technical and theoretical issues
that have prompted doctrinal and legislative intervention,
specifically in the most recent European Community ("EC" or
* Raffaele Cavani, Attorney-at-Law, Baker & McKenzie, Milan, Italy; L.L.M., Uni-
versity of Chicago; Ph.D. Candidate, University of Sassari, Italy. The framework for this
Essay was published by the author in Linee e Sviluppi Della Disciplina Comunitaria sui
Sistemi Telematici di Prenotazione per il Trasporto Aero, 8 IL DIRrro DELL'INFORMAZIONE E
DELL'INFoRmATicA 613 (May-Aug. 1992).
1. F.A. van Bakelen, Aviation Wzards-Terminal Hazards. Airlines' Computerized Res-
ervation Systems (C.R.S.): A Benefit or a Burden?, 13 AIR L. 77 (1988); Jerome Ellig, Com-
puter Reservation Systems, Creative Destruction and Consumer Welfare: Some Unsettled Issues, 19
TRANsP. L.J. 287 (1991).
2. See generally Fabio Carlucci, Trasporto Aereo: Liberalizzazione Comunitaria in una Vi-
sione di Industria 'Contestabile", 50-52 TRASPORTi 190 (1990) (interpreting doctrine of
contestable markets in relation to deregulation of air transport industry) citing G.
Tucci, II Processo di deregolamentazione nel trasporto aereo: verso una teoria della sua origine, in
RIsTA InRNAZIONALE DI ECONOMIA DEI TRASPORTI 54 (1982); Michael Spence, Contest-
able Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: a Review Article, 21 J. Ec. Lrr. 981
(1983) (providing general background on theory of contestable markets).
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"Community") legislation.'
This Essay points out the major legal issues related to the
development of the Computerized Reservation Systems ("CRS")
and evaluates whether the EC approach has achieved satisfactory
results, mainly from the standpoint of consumer protection. My
critique is essentially that the EC has ruled the CRS by means of
legislation that tends to be hyper-technical, difficult to interpret,
and, at the same time, extremely vague when it comes to defin-
ing unlawful conduct and potential sanctions. This Essay argues
that more in-depth regulatory reform should be undertaken by
the EC, in order to enhance competition and benefit travellers.
This Essay is structured in two conceptually interdependent
sections. Part I focuses on a synthetic description of CRS and
evaluates its potential to adversely impact a market based on free
competition, specifically by violating the antitrust rules of the
Treaty of Rome ("EEC Treaty").' Part II is devoted to an analysis
of the most recent EC regulations in this area, with particular
reference to Commission Regulation No. 83/91 of December 5,
1990.5
Regulation No. 83/91 gives a basic description of the CRS
system within the framework of EC legislation. The minimal ac-
tion undertaken thus far by the EC has been guided by two con-
siderations. First, the area of Computerized Reservation Systems
is still legally unstable and is characterized by gray areas and gaps
in the rules that should be resolved by future EC legislation.6
3. See, e.g., Commission Directive No. 90/388, OJ. L 192/10 (1990), (on concur-
rence in markets of telecommunications services); Council Decision No. 91/691, OJ. L
377/41 (1991) (adopting program for establishment of information services market).
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, arts. 85 and 86, Mar.
25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (cmd. 5179-I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 47-49 (1958) [herein-
after EEC TREATxY. The leading philosophy of the European Economic Community on
the subject of competition has been described as an "absolute faith in the values of
competition." RENP.JOLIET, THE RuLE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAw 59 (1967). See gener-
ally ALDO FRIGNANI & MICHEL WAELBROEK, DISCIPLINA DELLA CONCORRENZA NELLA CEE
(1983); CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETI-
TION (4th ed., 1993); DOEUWE J. GULsTRA & DAVID F. MuRPHY, LEADING CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC (3d ed., 1984); MARC VAN DER WOUDE
ET AL., EEC COMPETITION LAW HANDBOOK (1990); Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BEI-
LIS, COMPETITION LAw OF THE EEC (2d ed., 1990) (providing background on competi-
tion law of the EEC).
5. Commission Regulation No. 83/91, O.J. L 10/9 (1991).
6. For critical remarks and observations of a different nature, see JOHN BALFOUR,
AIR LAw AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 14 (1990); John Roland Mietus, Jr., European
Community Regulation of Airline Computer Reservation Systems, 21 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
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Second, in the absence of a line ofjudicial precedents within the
EC, a theoretical debate appears fruitless in light of the lack of a
substantially consolidated position within the EC.
I. GENERAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF
COMPUTERIZED RESERVATION SYSTEMS
Computerized Reservation Systems ("CRS") are among the
most dynamic instruments for the globalization and improve-
ment of services offered by the aeronautic industry and, more
generally, by the tourism industry. Information provided by CRS
will make a wide spectrum of services available to the public.
The majority of services sold within the travel industry are those
directly linked to the air transportation industry. The visualiza-
tion on computer terminal screens of data concerning specific
air traffic routes permits the traveller to organize and reserve the
type of trip best suited to his needs. For example, data screens
reveal the presence of multiple carriers, the possibility of direct
flights, the availability of specific seats, and the updating of
fares.
In addition, CRS provide information about complementary
travel services, including hotel reservations, tickets for connec-
tions with surface transportation, the organization of recrea-
tional activities, automobile rentals, and the purchase of tickets
for cultural events and performances.. CRS do not only consti-
tute a complete data bank for flights and rates for international
air carriers,' but, according to a doctrinal interpretation,' they
act as "authentic cartels, and are governed by groups [such as
airlines, travel agents, hotel and car rental chains, and advertis-
93 (1989); Bruno Lejeune, CEE: systimes informatiss de rjservation pour des transports ar-
iens, 4 COMPUTER & TELECOMS L. REV. .72 (1988);Jacques Derenne, Les systemes de riserva-
tion informatisis pour les transports abaens: un nouveau riglement d'exemption de la Commis-
sion, 2 COMPUTER & TELECOMS L. REV. 71 (1991); Silvio Busti, La disciplina comunitaria
deU'informatica sul trasporto aereo, in L'INwOaATICA NEL TRASPORTO AERO 199 (1991);
Silvio Busti, I sistemi telematici di prenotazione per il trasporto aereo nella disciplina
comunitaria, 1 DiRrrrO DE TRASPORTI 15 (1992).
7. See BALFOUR, supra note 6, at 14-16 (describing data processing within Comput-
erized Reservation Systems [hereinafter CRS]); "Ticketing Merger is Set," N.Y. TiMES,
Mar. 6, 1992, at D5 (describing functions of CRS); Derenne, supra note 6, at 71
(describing major European CRS).
8. Derenne, supra note 6, at 71.
9. See Busti, La disciplina comunitara deU'informatica sul trasporto aero, supra note 6 at
200; La nuova disciplina della conco-renza nel trasporto aereo comunitario, in DiRrrro
COMUNITARIO E DEGLI SCAMBI INTERNAZiONALi 693 (1989).
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ing and public relations agencies] in a way they can exploit a
dominant position on the market with respect to outsiders.""0
Travel agents distribute and sell commercial products re-
lated to the airline industry using telecommunications equip-
ment. Travel agencies therefore act as system terminals. The
practical effect of such "channeling" of public demand results in
preferential marketing of those services that are first indicated
on the computer screen, regardless of their actual quality or the
practical needs of consumers.'
Analogous situations are likely to arise with respect to those
services that are complementary to the airline industry. In evalu-
ating the structure of CRS, one should note that within the in-
dustry there exists a service distribution network rigidly blocked
by entrance barriers, a type of monopoly. The strength of these
barriers is directly proportional to the economic power of the
operators of such CRS. 12 In other words, groups of competing
businesses in a common computer information system may di-
vert demand for air travel and related services to the exclusive
advantage of the businesses, in the form of a monopoly. The
practical mechanism for directing this demand may be very sim-
ple. It may, for example, consist of accelerating or slowing down
the visual information on the computer screen, or even cancel-
ing possible options offered by outside competitors.1 3
Thus, there is the potential for and, hypothetically, evidence
of anti-competitive activity. In fact, a potential consumer may, in
some cases, receive incomplete or misleading information, or, in
other cases, not be informed at all. In simple terms, the sub-
scription to CRS functions as an instrument of market selection.
The telecommunications operator, in most cases the travel
agent, is able to block information concerning alternative serv-
ices offered by outside competitors, a form of censorship that
directs and often controls the choices available to the consum-
ers.
1 4
10. Busti, La disciplina comunitara deU'informatica sul trasporto aero, supra note 6, at
200 (original in Italian).
11. See id.; van Bakelen, supra note 1, at 78 (discussing marketing of air transport
services).
12. See Derenne, supra note 6, at 71 (describing major European CRS operators).
13. Id.
14. For a detailed survey of the general problems and possible abuses of "interline
agreements" and the practice of code sharing, see Guido Rinaldi Baccelli, La liberalizza-
zione del trasporto aereo in Europa, in TRASPORTI 150, 197 n.116 (1987). Baccelli examines
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Exploitation of CRS by system operators will most likely lead
to anti-competitive practices. Potential abuses include agree-
ments aimed at controlling or sharing the market of consumer
services related to air transportation. Such strategies will result
in a distortion of market competition, which creates a series of
oligopolies. These oligopolies give rise to a series of normative
measures, mostly within the EC, designed to minimize the risks
of anti-competitive activities. The exploitation of CRS has been
of considerable concern within the United States as well, where
anti-competitive abuse of CRS foreshadowed the European expe-
rience. 5
A. U.S. Reaction to Antitrust Issues Concerning CRS
The North American market of telecommunications systems
is actually dominated by two system leaders, Sabre (managed by
American Airlines) and Apollo (managed by United Airlines).
These two corporations have garnered control over approxi-
mately eighty percent of the tickets sold for domestic air travel.' 6
In 1978, the Carter Administration launched its airline de-
regulation policy with the adoption of the Airline Deregulation
Act ("ADA") .17 The ADA's objective was to minimize public con-
trol of the domestic airline industry and to allow the consumer
to benefit from the diversity of services that results from a fair
play of market forces. The effect of the policy, however, has
been less than successful. By the mid-1980's, the Civil Aeronau-
the possibility of an airline company absorbing traffic demands of a "legitimate" carrier,
who does not have the traffic rights to a route but nevertheless hires aircraft and equip-
ment of other carriers. Id.
15. In the United States, CRS is defined as
a system offered by a carrier to subscribers for use in the United States that
contains information about schedules, fares, rules, and availability of other
carriers and that provides subscribers with the ability to issue tickets.
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-Airline Computer Reservation Systems, U.S. Civil Aer-
onautics Board, Ec. Reg. Docket No. 41,686 (Nov. 1983) (comments and proposed
rules of the U.S. Dept. of Justice), codified at 14 C.F.R- § 255 (1993) (defining regula-
tions for carrier-owned computer reservation systems in United States).
16. Collins, Games Airlines Can Play with Reservation Systems, THE TiME, Jan. 1, 1987;
Richard J. Fahy, Regulation of Computerized Reservation Systems in the United States and Eu-
rope, 11 AIR L. 232 (1986). Other CRS of minor mention, commercialized by Eastern
Airlines, TWA and Delta Airlines are called, respectively, Soda, Pars and Dasata. van
Bakelen, supra note 1, at 79.
17. Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301-1384 (1988 & Supp. II 1991).
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tics Board ("CAB"),18 faced a series of claims from carriers, who
were not associated with CRS, which denounced the anti-com-
petitive behavior concerning the release of information on air-
line fees, connecting flights, and reservations. 9 In an August
1984 decision, the CAB outlined specific practices that displayed
anti-competitiveness and unfair bias. °
B. Europe's Reaction to Antitrust Issues Concerning CRS
The European information industry in the air transport sec-
tor is characterized by two oligopolistic structures that share the
relevant market. This market situation seems incompatible with
the principles of free competition fostered by the EC and, more
specifically, appears to conflict with the principles dictated by
Articles 8521 and 8622 of the EEC Treaty.
It is notorious, in fact, that the economic system embodied
by the EEC Treaty rests on the principles of a free market econ-
omy. The maintenance of adequate competition is a major con-
sideration governing both the functions of the Common Market
18. The Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB"), a governmental unit that controlled and
regulated air traffic, was created in 1958 by Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958), was
terminated in 1984. 49 U.S.C. App. § 1551 (1988).
19. See United Airlines Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 766 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir.,
1985) (upholding CAB rules on Carrier-owned C.R.S.); Carrier-owned CRS 14 C.F.R.
§ 255 (1993); Patricia Barlow, Aviation Antitrust-International Considerations After Sunset,
12 AIR L. 68, 75 (1987).
20. Carrier-owned C.R.S., 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (1984) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 255
(1993)). These practices include discrimination in the publication of data collected
from various carriers according to their subscription to a data information system. Id.
21. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 85(1), provides that:
The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market
and shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of enterprises and
concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the Member States
and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distor-
tion of competition within the Common Market ....
Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-48 (emphasis added).
22. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 86, provides in relevant part:
[Any]... action by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a
dominant position within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it
shall be deemed incompatible with the Common Market and shall hereby be
prohibited.
Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 48 (emphasis added).
Articles 85 and 86 provide the basic rules on competition in the European Com-
munity, and follow Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(1988). Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibit practices in interstate
commerce and in trade or commerce "with foreign nations." Id.
COMPUTERIZED RESERVATION SYSTEMS
and the economies of the Member States. Articles 85 through
89 contain competition rules applicable to private enterprises.23
These rules aim at ensuring that the creation of effective condi-
tions of competition in the Common Market is not hindered by
the erection of private barriers or restrictions. The maintenance
of competition thus constitutes an essential canon of the Com-
munity's economic and legal order. Accordingly, the Court of
Justice has traditionally held that articles 85 and 86 must be in-
terpreted and applied in light of articles 2 and 3(f) of the EEC
Treaty. 24
With specific regards to the CRS, the EC reaction to prac-
tices or conduct that seem inconsistent with the relevant anti-
trust provisions concentrates essentially on a system of regulatory
measures, such as Regulations No. 2672/88, No. 2299/89, and
No. 83/91.2' To varying degrees, these regulations aim to guar-
antee complete and nondiscriminatory information, fair access
to the computer systems for all air carriers, and a policy to pro-
tect free market equilibrium.
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EC LEGISLATION ON CRS:
REGULATIONS NO. 2672/88, NO. 2299/89,
AND NO. 83/91
Legal analysis of the consequences of CRS has only recently
become the object of evaluation and legislative reaction by the
Community institutions. The EC response has been limited to
23. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 85-89, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-49.
24. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 2 and 3(f), 298 U.N.T.S. at 15-16. Article 2
states:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of member states, to pro-
mote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic ac-
tivities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accel-
erated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its mem-
ber states.
Id. art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 15.
Article 3(f) states that the European Community's activities shall include, "the es-
tablishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted in the Com-
mon Market." Id. art. 3(f), 298 U.N.T.S. at 16. See Europemballage and Continental
Can Co. Inc. v. Commission, Case 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199, 219. See
generally Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating EC Competition Law, 61
AN-rrrausT L.J. 55 (1992) (providing brief analysis of EC competition law).
25. Commission Regulation No. 2672/88, O.J. L 239/13 (1988); Council Regula-
tion No. 2299/89, O.J. L 220/1 (1989); Commission Regulation No. 83/91, O.J. L 10/9
(1991).
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those aspects of CRS that are able to interfere with the free
movement of services within the EC.26 The direct impact of Arti-
cles 85 and 86 on agreements between corporations interested
in the organized growth of telecommunication systems within
the airline industry is the cornerstone of EC legislation in this
area.27
Council Regulation No. 3976/87 of December 14, .198728
entitles the Commission to apply Article 85, paragraph 3 of the
EC Treaty to certain categories of agreements and practices
within the air transportation industry. 29 Block exemptions to
agreements, which improve the production and distribution of
consumer services and enhance the technical aspects of the in-
dustry's products, benefit parties willing to utilize CRS for sched-
uling flights, making reservations, and issuing tickets by carriers.
Block exemptions, however, operate on the presumption that
carriers of the Member States have equal access to the computer
information systems. This includes the presumption that the
services offered by participating carriers are not part of any anti-
competitive scheme and that every participant is entitled to ter-
minate his subscription to CRS with reasonable notice. 0
On the basis of Article 2 of Regulation No. 3976/87,"' the
Commission, in 1988, enacted Regulation No. 2672/88,2 which
26. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 74-84, 298 U.N.T.S. at 44-47 (setting out
Community, transport policy).
27. The main issues of the debate concerning air transportation and computerized
systems are summarized in Busti, La disciplina communitara dell'informatica sul trasporto
aero, supra note 6, at 20. See Re Olympic Airways AE, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 730, Commission
Decision 85/121, Oj. L 46/51 (1985); Council Regulation No. 17/62 O.J. L 204/62
(1962). The inapplicability of Regulation Number 17/62 in a real sense to the air trans-
port sector, aimed at the transfer of things and/or people from one place to another, is
provided by Council Regulation No. 141 O.J. L 2751/62 (1962).
28. Council Regulation No. 3976/87, Oj. L 374/9 (1987).
29. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 85(3),, 298 U.N.T.S. at 48 (providing, inter
alia, exceptions to EC competition rules for practices which improve production and
distribution of goods or promote technical and economic progress). Commission Reg-
ulation No. 3652/93, O.J. L 333/37 (1993), expressly confirmed the applicability of
EEC Treaty article 85(3) to some categories of agreements among undertakings con-
cerning the CRS.
30. Council Regulation No. 3976/87, art. 2, O.J. L 374/9, at 10 (1987). The possi-
bility of exemptions through regulations, according to Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty,
was originally set atJanuary 31, 1991. Id. art. 3, O.J. L 374/9, at 10 (1987). This dead-
line was subsequently extended to December 31, 1992. Council Regulation No. 2344/
90, art. 1, O.J. L 217/15 (1990).
31. Council Regulation No. 3976/87, art. 2, O.J. L 374/9, at 10 (1987).
32. Commission Regulation No. 2672/88, O.J. L 239/13 (1988).
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sought to improve the distribution of these services and reduce
the costs resulting from a system of block exemptions."3 The
Regulation sets out fundamental guidelines for the identification
ofconduct that is exempted. For example, Article 1 of Regula-
tion No. 2672/88 declares that the nullity sanction of Article 85,
paragraph 1, of the EC Treaty is inapplicable to agreements
among competing parties that have as their object: (a) the acqui-
sition and common development of a CRS;; (b) the establish-
ment of a CRS that functions as "the seller of the system,"
whereby the sale and management of the CRS are assimilated,
for its commercialization; and (c) the management of the distri-
bution functions for sale and resale.3 4
Article 2 of Regulation No. 2672/88 outlines the obligations
imposed on carriers participating in CRS, as well as on sellers of
the CRS.35 These obligations aim at preserving fair competition
in the disbursement of information. The obligations created by
Regulation No. 2672/88 can be summarized in the following
terms: guarantee of equal access to CRS for all interested car-
ers, without imposing unnecessary conditions precedent to ac-
ceptance into CRS;36 "neutral presentation" on the computer
screen of data furnished to the subscribing carriers with an abso-
lute prohibition against furnishing inexact or misleading infor-
mation;37 clarity in the presentation of information;38 reciprocity
among carriers associated with other CRS;3 9 the possibility of ter-
minating one's subscription to a CRS with adequate notice that
includes the prohibition of exclusive contracts with subscrib-
ers;4° and the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements among
33. Id. art. 1, O.J. L 239/13 at 14 (1988).
34. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 85(1), 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-48 (listing anti-compet-
itive practices which are incompatible with common market). Article 85, however,
leaves unprejudiced the possible profile of an abuse of dominant position according to
Article 86. Id., art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-48.
35. Commission Regulation No. 2672/88, art. 2, O.J. L 239/13, at 14 (1988).
36. Id. art. 3, O.J. L 239/13 at 14 (1988) (setting guidelines for access to CRS).
37. Id. art. 4, OJ. L 239/13 at 14-15 (1988) (setting guidelines for information to
appear on display).
38. Id. art. 5, O.J. L 239/13 at 15 (1988) (mandating non-discrimination in care
and timeliness of information loading onto CRS).
39. Id. art. 7, O.J. L 239/13 at 15 (1988) (setting parameters for reciprocity among
carriers).
40. Id. art. 8, O.J. L 239/13 at 15 (1988) (detailing contractual rights of subscrib-
1994]
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CRS vendors.4 1 Furthermore, the Regulation subordinates the
benefit of the exemption to fundamental guarantees, such as the
maintenance of effective competition in the CRS market or that
"of other services that are connected to travel."4" Finally, the
Regulation encourages parity of treatment in price fixing by CRS
vendors and in determining contractual conditions for the use
of CRS by subscribers.
Along the same rationale, Regulation No. 2299/89, passed
by the Council on July 24, 1989, 43 instituted a binding "code of
conduct" in the area of CRS telecommunications. Article 1 de-
fines the Regulation as applying only to CRS "offered for use
and/or utilization in the territory of the [EC] ," regardless of the
status or nationality of the CRS vendor, the identity of informa-
tion source, the location of the central data processing unit, or
the geographic location of the airline service.44 The Regulation
uses a simple standard for identifying the CRS that comes within
the Regulation's meaning.45
The Regulation described above is aimed not so much at
curbing the effects of anti-competitive activity as it is aimed at
preventing future harm by regulating the phase in which the in-
formation has developed. Moreover, chartered services are ex-
cluded from "airline services," for purposes of the Regulation; 46
services rendered by non-EC carriers are also excluded, with the
exception of the possible application of the reciprocity clause
granted by article 7 for carriers of non-EC countries. 47 Such ex-
clusions highlight a gap in the rules on cabotage in inter-Com-
munity traffic, as well as extra-Community traffic, which remains
basically unregulated, although such traffic may adversely affect
trade within the Community.4
41. Id. art. 10, OJ. L 239/13 at 15 (1988) (proscribing anti-competitive agreements
between system vendors).
42. Id. art. 11, OJ. L 239/13 at 15 (1988) (listing situations in which carriers are in
possible violation of Article 85).
43. Council Regulation No. 2299/89, O.J. L 220/1 (1989). The regulation consti-
tutes a Code of Conduct governing CRS. Id.
44. Id.
45. A conforming opinion is expressed by Busti in I sistemi telematici di prenotazione
per il trasporto aereo nella disciplina comunitaria, supra note 6, at 27.
46. Council Regulation No. 2299/89, O.J. L 220/1 (1989).
47. Id. art. 7, Oj. L 220/1, at 3 (1989).
48. Other competition issues concerning the air transportation industry can be
found in Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo Gmbh v. Zentrale Zur
[Vol. 17:441
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In Regulation 2299/89, the concepts mentioned in Regula-
tion No. 2672/88 re-appear and pinpoint concepts such as
"seller of the system," "associated carriers,"- "subscriber," and
"primary display," where the need for equal access to system
structures is constantly emphasized. Moreover, Articles 11
through 20 of Regulation No. 2299/89 prescribe monetary sanc-
tions to condemned parties, in the event of an antitrust viola-
tion, submitted to the Courtof Justice by the Commission.49
One weakness in Regulation 2299/89 is the lack of a provi-
sion controlling the terminal point of the CRS, which is con-
trolled by travel agencies. It is in this micro-distributive phase
that possible anti-competitive abuses may unfairly influence con-
sumer demand.5" Article 9, paragraph 5 of Regulation No.
2299/89 implicitly refers to this problem,5 ' but contains no ef-
fective sanction (provided by the Community legislator so that
the seller of the system is able to guarantee correct information
that is neither deceptive nor discriminatory in use). Vague con-
cepts such as "technical means" or "subscription contract,"
which are contained in the Regulation, could hardly have bind-
ing effects on Member States. One of the goals of the EC is to
guarantee a "neutral" presentation of data by travel agents
through a fair display of the data in their possession. Since Reg-
ulation No. 2299/89 provides no penalties against the agent for
Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs Ev, Case 66/86, [1989] ,E.C.R. 803, [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 102.
49. Council Regulation No. 2299/89, arts. 11-20, O.J. L 220/1 at 4-6 (1989) (detail-
ing complaint and investigation procedures).
50. Airlines provide a vast range of services that may be booked and sold through
travel agencies. In order to obtain relevant information concerning fares, routes and
complementary services, the travel agent subscribes to a CRS, which is owned and man-
aged by a pool of airlines. Subscription contracts generally contain exclusivity clauses
that prevent travel agents from participating in other systems. Subscribers, therefore,
only have access to the information contained in the specific CRS to which they sub-
scribe. Customers, in turn, purchase travel services suggested by the travel agent, with-
out further inquiring whether the services offered are really the best option or whether
other possibilities exist (e.g., those offered by competitor CRS). In short, a CRS may
serve as a tool to eliminate competitors from the market of information data.
51. Council Regulation No. 2299/89, art. 9, 5, O.J. L 220/1, at 4 (1989), states:
A system vendor shall ensure, either through technical means or through the
contract with the subscriber, that the principal display is provided for each
individual transaction and the subscriber does not manipulate material sup-
plied by the CRS in a manner that would lead to inexact, false or discrimina-
tory presentation of information to consumers ....
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failure to provide a neutral presentation, the Regulation is likely
to have little effect. Therefore, the binding effect of this Regula-
tion is considerably weak in these aspects.
Gaps in the Code of Conduct induced the Commission to
promulgate an explanatory note for the integration and actuali-
zation of Regulation No. 2299/89.52 This explanatory note fo-
cuses on the behavior of travel agents and on the need to furnish
the buyer with global, information in CRS that is both precise
and reliable. 53 Nevertheless, to date, there has been no appreci-
able change within the EC. On the other hand, Regulation No.
83/91, 54 passed by the EC Commission on December 5, 1990,
which returns to and updates Regulation No. 2299/89, merits
reconsideration. 55
The primary structure of Regulation No. 83/91 connotes a
general goal to which the Commission seems oriented. Regula-
tion 83/91 touches many of the major antitrust issues of the EC
(such as the need to foster fair competition and the freedom of
access to the market without discrimination) and could there-
fore be interpreted as an application to the specific issue of the
CRS of the general principles underlying articles 85 and 86.
Nevertheless, the retroactive effect of Regulation No. 83/91,
confirmed by Article 13, paragraph 2, is applicable to agree-
ments, decisions, and concerted practices existing at the time it
entered into force, provided all requirements for exemptions
were met.56 Regulation No. 83/91 reaffirms the need to prevent
a division of the market through anti-competitive practices. The
Regulation, however, does not differ significantly from the Code
of Conduct, with the exception of a few minor variations in ter-
minology that are irrelevant.
There are, however, problems of interpretation of Article 8
of this Regulation, which instills the principle of reciprocity
among air carriers of third countries where, at the same time,
"equal treatment" is assured to EC air carriers. The concept of
"equal treatment," which is vague in its breadth, has its central
idea in Article 8 Paragraph 2, which uses the same definition
52. Council Regulation No. 2299/89, O.J. L 220/1 (1989).
53. Explanatory Note on the EEC Code of Conduct for Computerized Reservation
Systems, OJ. C 184/2 (1990).
54. Commission Regulation No. 83/91, O.J. L 10/9 (1991).
55. Council Regulation No. 2299/89, O.J. L 220/1 (1989).
56. Commission Regulation No. 83/91, O.J. L 10/9 (1991).
COMPUTERIZED RESERVATION SYSTEMS
that the Code of Conduct articulated by the phrase "CRS con-
trolled by air carriers of a third country."57
The carriers in question are exempt from Article 10, which
prohibits the imposition on subscribers to CRS, of exclusive du-
ties for the sale of air transportation services through CRS with
which the same subscriber is associated. The concept of control
by air carriers from third countries does not have a uniform defi-
nition.58 , However, it remains to be seen whether such control
refers to a simple share participation in the subscriptions to CRS,
whether it extends to include a "functional" control, or whether
it involves a threshold limit that delineates the boundaries of
control. Furthermore, the concept of control delineated in Reg-
ulation No. 83/91 does not define clearly the related concept of
"dominant position," the abuse of which is sanctioned by EC
Treaty Article 86, but is not mentioned among the "exemptions"
of Regulation No. 83/91.19
The EC approach to the CRS does not provide effective pro-
tection for travellers. The regulations scrutinized above simply
miss this goal. While they attempt to prevent practices of unfair
competition and abuse of dominant positions of CRS vendors,
they do not grant specific legal remedies to consumers. The ma-
jor legal steps that have been taken in this regard rest on the
Commission's initiative under the normal antitrust procedures. 60
At least two solutions seem likely to fulfill such lack of protec-
tion; the radical solution would allow for direct action against
CRS vendors by individual consumers and consumers organiza-
tions. In order to grant such actions, European courts should
probably reconsider (or at least interpret in a broad fashion) the
concept of "privity of contract." Only CRS vendors and* travel
agents are bound by subscription contracts, while consumers are
third parties. This would imply the formal recognition of a right
to the fair information, protected as such, regardless of the iden
tity or the cause of action of the plaintiff.:
57. Id. art. 13, OJ. L 10/9, at 12 (1991).
58. See Busti, La disciplina comunitafia deU'informatica sul trasporto aereo, supra note 6
at 220; Derenne, supra note 6, at 73 (analyzing controls on air carriers by third coun-
tries).
59. Commission Regulation No. 83/91, art. 1, OJ. L 10/9, at 10 (1991).
60. See BELLAMYr & CHILD, supra note 4, supp., at 1 (providing analysis of major
provisions and cases on EC competition law); GULsraA & MuRPHY, supra note 4 (analyz-
ing developments in EC competition law).
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Nevertheless, I would opt for a less extreme approach. This
would imply that the EC should further regulate the CRS, and
spell out the rights and remedies even of the third parties (such
as consumers) vis-4-vis CRS vendors and travel agents. By doing
so, the process towards optimization of consumers' benefits
could be enhanced from three different viewpoints: (i) there
would be a clear identification of the applicable set of rules and
of the competent jurisdiction; (ii) travel agencies would presum-
ably reduce display bias practices and therefore a system of more
accurate information could be fostered; and (iii) consumers
would play a major role in the overall legal scenario. They could
be granted the power, hypothetically, to file a complaint, even in
the absence of actual damages to a specific traveller.61 Such
goals call for a more detailed regulatory reform of the CRS to be
carried out by the EC institutions.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EC LEGISLATION ON CRS:
REGULATIONS NO. 3089/93, AN NO. 3652/93
Rather significant changes have recently been enacted in
the EC legislation on CRS, after the promulgation of Council
Regulation No. 3089/93,62 of October 29, 1993, and Commis-
sion Regulation No. 3652/93,63 promulgated December 22,
1993. Regulation No. 3089/93 has modified Regulation No.
2299/89, 4 providing for a new, amended Code of Conduct
among CRS vendors in the Community, whereas the second has
expressly confirmed the applicability of the procedure of exemp-
tion, according to Article 85, paragraph 3 of the Treaty of
Rome, 65 to certain agreements or concerted practices among un-
dertakings with regard to CRS for air transportation.66
The new "code of conduct" was introducted by an opinion
61. For example, the role of organizations such as the International Foundation of
Airline Passengers' Association (IFAPA) should be fostered. IFAPA, a non-profit organ-
ization established in Switzerland, promotes, researches, and represents the interests of
airline passengers with governments, airlines, and the travel industry at international,
regional and national levels. See NIKoLi EHLERS, COMPUTERIZED RESERVATIONS IN THE
AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 63 (1988).
62. Council Regulation No. 3089/93, 0J. L 278/1 (1993).
63. Council Regulation No. 3652/93, O.J. L 333/37 (1993).
64. Council Regulation No. 2299/89, OJ. L 220/1 (1989).
65. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 85(3), 298 U.N.T.S. at 48.
66. Council Regulation No. 3089/93, OJ. L 278/1 (1993).
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of the Economic and Social Committee,67 which explained the
main arguments in favor of a substantial amendment to Regula-
don No. 2299/89. Among these, such opinion expressly refers
to the suggestions made by the EC Commission for a new draft-
ing of the existing code of conduct. Four points constituted the
backbone of the Commission's argument:
(i) the rapid development of the CRS, from both a commeri-
cal and technological standpoint, and the fairly questionable
effectiveness of the existing code;
(ii) the enactment of the so-called "Third package imple-
menting the final phase of aviation liberalization" ;68
(iii) the risk that CRS vendors may prevent other CRS from
entering the relevant market by refusing to share with them
the information in their possession;
(iv) the risk that a carrier may provide more accurate and
detailed information concerning its schedules, fares and avail-
ability of seats to its own CRS alone, therefore granting an
unjustified, unfair benefit to such system and violating the
principles of fairness and "neutrality" while displaying data.69
A crucial provision of Regulation No. 3089/93, which is set
forth in Article 1, applies to all CRS used within Community ter-
ritory, regardless of their nationality, their sources of informa-
tion, and the airports used for specific traffic routes.7 ° Equally
relevant are the preliminary considerations to Regulation No.
3089/93, which expressly refer to the increasing business impor-
67. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, O.J. C 108/16 (1993).
68. See, e.g., GIEMULLA, SCHMID & MOLtS, EUR. AIR L. 62 (1993) (summarizing
"Third package," adopted by EC Council in June 1992, permitting greater freedom in
pricing, and increasing market access). For an in-depth analysis of the main antitrust
issues related to air transportation in the EC, seeJohn Temple Lang, Air Transport in the
EEC - Community Antitrust Law Aspects, in 1991 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST. 287 (B. Hawk,
ed. 1992).
69. This technique is commonly known as "dehosting."
70. Council Regulation No. 3089/93, art. 1, OJ. L 278/1 at 2 (1993). Article 1
states:
This Regulation shall apply to computerized reservation systems to the extent
that they contain air transport products, when offered for use and/or used in
the territory of the Community, irrespective of:
- the status or nationality of the system vendor,
- the source of the information used or the location of the relevant central
data processing unit,
- the geographical location of the airports between which air carriage takes
place.
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tance of charter flights in the European tourism industry, and
require an equal consideration of scheduled and non-scheduled
flights, in terms of guarantees of fair and impartial information
provided to consumers.71
Less significant, in my view, are the changes in Regulation
No. 3652/93.72 These changes closely follow the path already
taken by Regulation No. 83/91," in the sense of the applicability
of EEC Treaty article 85, paragraph 374 to CRS. 75 Interestingly
enough, the fifth preliminary consideration of such legislation
outlines an economic justification for the exemptions.7 6' "Coop-
eration" seems to be the crucial word.77 It is questionable, at this
early stage, and absent any doctrinal interpretation on this very
point, whether the Commission had in mind a legal scenario of
joint ventures among European carriers, or whether it was
merely referring to the need for a closer, yet infrequent, ex-
change of information and technical data among EC undertak-
ings.
CONCLUSION
The issues discussed above are not merely theoretical, in
light of the possibility of EC and non-EC air carriers growing by
joint ventures into one system. Potential dangers in this area in-
clude uncertainty in the regulatory field and difficulty in sanc-
tioning anti-competitive practices of non-EC parties outside the
EC with EC legal structures. In summary, with Regulation No.
83/91, the EC has affirmed the trend of recent years, by attempt-
ing to protect free competition and to guarantee impartial use of
CRS as well as insuring accuracy and availability of information
71. Id.
72. Commission Regulation No. 3652/93, O.J. L 333/37 (1993).
73. Commission Regulation No. 83/91, O.J. L 10/9 (1991).
74. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 85(3), 298 U.N.T.S. at 48.
75. Article 15 of Regulation No. 3652/93 has extended the expiration date of the
exemption to June 30, 1998. Commission Regulation No. 3652/93, art. 15, O.J. L 333/
37 (1993).
76. Commission Regulation No. 3652/93, O.J. L 333/37 at 37 (1993). The fifth
preliminary consideration states in relevant part:
The CRS market is such that few individual European undertakings could on
their own make the investment and achieve the economies of scale required to
compete with the more advanced existing systems.
Id.
77. Id. "Cooperation in this field should therefore be permitted. A block exemp-
tion should therefore be granted for such cooperation." Id.
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to the public. Nevertheless, this regulatory effort is often limited
to vague principles devoid of any real regulatory bite.
The overall efficiency of the, system could be improved
through tighter control of travel agencies working in the indus-
try. Travel agencies act as the very last distributors of services
offered by CRS. Nevertheless, their behavior is not heavily regu-
lated. EC legislation refers to them only incidentally and ap-
pears to undervalue their role in the distribution of CRS services.
The real question is not whether a deregulated CRS market is
preferable to a strictly regulated one. What is essential to ad-
dress is not the quantity, but the quality of the EC legislation
involved, i.e., the enforceability level within the EC as well as in
Member States.
Finally, absent any clear provision in EC legislation, one
may ponder the possibility of a consumers' action against air car-
riers and travel agencies, should anti-competitive acts take place
within a CRS. My view is that only an action in tort, specifically
on the grounds of non-contractual liability, should be granted to
consumers. Given the doctrine of privity of contract, it does not
seem technically correct to grant the public the right to file a
direct claim against the vendors or operators of the systems.
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